Plato's Dialogue of Hippias greater analysis. A

Hippias the Greater

Hippias the Greater

Translation: M.S. Solovyova

Socrates, Hippias

Socrates. Hippias, glorious and wise, you have finally arrived to us in Athens!

Hippias. It's all too much time, Socrates. Whenever Elide needs to negotiate with any state, she turns to me before any other citizen, and chooses me as ambassador, considering me the most suitable judge and messenger of those speeches that are usually made from each of the citizens. states Many times I was ambassador to various states, most often and on the most numerous and important matters - in Lacedaemon. This is my answer to your question, because I don’t come to your places often.

Socrates. This is what it means, Hippias, to be a truly wise and perfect person. After all, you can privacy, taking a lot of money from young people, bring them even greater benefit than this money; on the other hand, you know how to provide benefits to your state in the public sphere, as anyone should do who does not want to be despised, but, on the contrary, wants to enjoy good fame among the people. However, Hippias, what is the reason that the ancient men who glorified their names with wisdom - Pittacus, and Bias, and the followers of the Milesian Thales, and even those who lived later, right up to Anaxagoras - all or most of them, apparently, held on away from government affairs?

Hippias. What other reason, Socrates, if not the fact that they were unable and unable to grasp with reason both of them - public affairs and private affairs?

Socrates. This means, I swear by Zeus, just as all other arts have made progress and, in comparison with those of today, the old masters are bad, the same will have to be said about your art - the art of the Sophists: it has made progress, and the wise men of the ancients are bad in comparison with you.

Hippias. Absolutely correct.

Socrates. Therefore, Hippias, if Bias were to come to life among us now, he would probably make you laugh, just as sculptors say about Daedalus that if he appeared now and began to perform the same works as those who created his name, he would be funny.

Hippias. All this is as you say, Socrates. However, I still usually praise the ancients and those who lived before us first of all and more than the present, since I am wary of the envy of the living and fear the wrath of the dead.

Socrates. You, Hippias, in my opinion, speak and reason beautifully, and I can confirm the correctness of your words. Indeed, your art has made progress in that it makes it possible to engage in public affairs along with private ones. After all, Gorgias, the Leontine sophist, came here from his homeland in public order, as an ambassador and as a person most capable of all the Leontines for public activity; he turned out to be an excellent speaker in the People's Assembly, and privately, giving demonstrative speeches and studying with young people, he earned and collected a lot of money from our city, with If you like, then our friend, the famous Prodicus, often came here before public affairs, and the last time, recently, having arrived from Keos on the same kind of business, he distinguished himself very much with his speech in the Council, and privately, giving demonstrative speeches and studying with young people, he received a surprising amount of money. And of those ancients, no one ever considered it possible to demand monetary rewards and flaunt their wisdom in front of all kinds of people. That's how simple they were! Didn't notice that money has a high price. Of these same two husbands, each earned with his wisdom more money than other masters of any art, and even earlier than them - Protagoras.

Hippias. You, Socrates, really don’t know anything about this! If you knew how much money I made, you would be amazed! Not to mention the rest, when I once arrived in Sicily, while Protagoras, a famous man and older than me in age, was there, I still, being much younger than him, in a short time earned much more than one hundred and fifty minas, yes Moreover, in just one very small place, Inika, more than twenty minutes. Arriving home with this money, I gave it to my father, so that both he and all the other citizens were surprised and amazed. I think I probably made more money than any two other sophists put together.

Socrates. You, Hippias, provide an excellent and important proof of wisdom, both your own and in general today's people- how different they are from the ancients! Great was, as you say, the ignorance of the people who lived before. What happened to Anaxagoras, they say, is the opposite of what happens to you: he inherited a lot of money, but through carelessness he lost everything, what a foolish sage he was! And similar things were told about others who lived in the old days. So, it seems to me that you give an excellent proof of the wisdom of modern people compared with former ones. Many agree that a wise man must first of all be wise for himself. It is defined this way: the one who has earned more money is wise. But enough of that. Tell me this: in which of the countries you visit did you earn the most money? Apparently, in Lacedaemon, where do you go most often?

Hippias. No, Socrates, I swear by Zeus!

Socrates. What are you talking about? So Lacedaemon has the least amount of everything? with Hippias. I never received anything there at all. Socrates. You say strange things, Hippias, amazing! Tell me: is not your wisdom capable of making those who follow and learn it more virtuous?

Hippias. And even very much so.

Socrates. So, you were able to make the sons of the Inikians better, but not the sons of the Spartiates?

Hippias. A long way from that.

Socrates. Then, then, the Sicilians strive to become the best, but the Lacedaemonians do not?

Hippias. And the Lacedaemonians are very eager, Socrates.

Socrates. Maybe they avoided communicating with you due to lack of money?

Hippias. No, of course, they have enough money.

Socrates. What is the reason that, although they have both desire and money, and you could help them with the most important things, they let you go unloaded with money? Surely it is incredible that the Lacedaemonians could raise their children better than you can? Or is this true and you agree with it?

Hippias. No way.

Socrates. Perhaps you have failed to convince the young people of Lacedaemon that through association with you they will advance in virtue more than if they associate with their own? Or could you not convince the fathers of these young men that, if only they care about their sons, they should rather entrust them to you than take care of them themselves? After all, it wasn’t out of envy that fathers prevented their children from becoming the best they could be?

Apology of Socrates Crito, or About what should be Phaedo, or On the Soul Second tetralogy : Cratylus, or On the Correctness of Names Theaetetus, or About knowledge The Sophist, or About Existence Politician, or about Tsarist power Third tetralogy : Parmenides, or On Ideas Philebus, or On Pleasure Feast, or About the Good Phaedrus, or About Love Fourth tetralogy : Alcibiades the First Alcibiades II, or On Prayer Hipparchus, or the Silver Lover Rivals, or About Philosophy Fifth tetralogy : Feag, or On Philosophy Charmides, or On Moderation Lakhet, or About Courage Lysias, or About Friendship Sixth tetralogy : Euthydemus, or the Disputant Protagoras or Sophists Gorgias, or On Rhetoric Meno, or On Virtue Seventh tetralogy : Hippias the first or About beauty Hippias the second or About what should be Ion, or the Iliad Menexen, or Funeral Oration Eighth tetralogy : Clitophon, or Introduction The State, or About Justice Timaeus, or On Nature Critias or Atlantis Ninth tetralogy : Minos, or On the Law Laws, or About legislation Post-Law, or Night Council, or Philosopher thirteen Letters

Preamble

The participants in the dialogue are Socrates and Hippias, who came to Athens from Elis, a diplomat and teacher of wisdom (sophist). Socrates is interested in why the ancient sages (for example, Bias), unlike modern ones (Gorgias, Prodicus, Protagoras), were not involved in government affairs. Then it turns out that the coldest reception to the sophists was given to the Spartans, who preferred to receive wisdom not from foreign sages, but from their ancestors. Moreover, they exclusively hold in high esteem knowledge of their own history.

Raising the question of beauty

Then Socrates poses the question: what is beautiful? (Greek τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν . 289d). At the same time, he claims that someone himself asked him this question and put him, Socrates, at a dead end. At the same time, Socrates asks “not about what is beautiful, but about what is beautiful.”

Hippias tries to give an example by arguing that beautiful is beautiful girl (Greek παρθένος καλὴ καλόν .287e). Socrates notes that a girl becomes beautiful not on her own, but thanks to “beauty itself” (Greek. αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν . 288a). Just as thanks to this beauty, not only a girl, but also a horse (Greek. ἵππος . 288b), as well as the lyre (Greek. λύρα ) and pot (Greek. χύτρα . 288c). Socrates then notes that a beautiful pot can be considered the one that best suits its purpose, if it is made by a good craftsman, is round, fired and has sufficient capacity.

Hierarchy of beauty

Hippias objects that this does not clarify the essence of the matter. To this, Socrates recalls the saying of Heraclitus: The most beautiful of monkeys is the ugliest when compared with the human race.(Greek ἄρα πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν . 289a). On this he builds a hierarchy of beauty: a beautiful pot is uglier than a beautiful girl, but the beautiful girl herself is uglier compared to the race of gods. Various things become beautiful thanks to a certain idea (Greek. εἶδος . 289d).

Independence of beauty from material

Hippias tries to reduce beauty to the material used to decorate, such as gold, but Socrates argues that beauty is independent of material, as Phidias created a beautiful statue of Athena, making the eyes and hands from ivory (290b). Convinced by Socrates, Hypius says that it is wonderful to be rich and honored. Producing further reflections, Socrates argues that the beautiful is suitable, useful and pleasant. However, Socrates also says that beauty is the cause of good(Greek ὸ καλόν ἐστιν αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ . 297b), from which it follows that beauty and goodness are not the same thing, just as father and son are not the same thing.

Beautiful and pleasant

Next, Socrates examines the relationship between the pleasant and the beautiful, noting that they are not in a relation of identity, since not everything that is beautiful is pleasant (for example, beautiful laws), and not everything that is pleasant is beautiful.

At the end of the dialogue, Socrates admits that beauty is difficult.

Notes

Sources

  • Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903.
  • Hippias the Great //Plato. Op. in 3 volumes, T.1, M., 1972.
  • Hippias the Great //Plato. Op. in 4 volumes, T.1, M.: Mysl, 1994.

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See what “Hippias the Greater (Plato)” is in other dictionaries:

    - (nlato) (427 347 BC) other Greek. thinker, along with Pythagoras, Parmenides and Socrates, the ancestor European philosophy, head of philosophy School Academy. Biographical information. P. representative of an aristocratic family that took an active... Philosophical Encyclopedia

    - (Hippias) (lived about 400 BC) – ancient Greek. philosopher from Elis, younger contemporary of Protagoras and Socrates, sophist. He had extensive knowledge in many sciences; distinguished natural law and human law (norm); Plato named him after... Philosophical Encyclopedia

    - (c. 427 347 BC), Greek philosopher and teacher. Born in Athens in 428 or 427 BC. and died there at the age of 80 or 81. His father Ariston (who died when Plato was still a child) belonged to a family that played a prominent role in the era... ... Collier's Encyclopedia

    PLATO (428 or 427 BC 348 or 347), ancient Greek philosopher. Disciple of Socrates, ca. 387 founded a school in Athens (see Plato's Academy (see PLATO'S ACADEMY)). Ideas (the highest among them is the idea of ​​good) are eternal and unchangeable, intelligible... ... Encyclopedic Dictionary

    Plato, Plato, 427 347 BC e., Greek philosopher. Born in Athens. P.'s real name was Aristocles. The nickname Plato (Broad-shouldered) was given to him in his youth for his powerful physique. He came from a noble family and received a wonderful... ... Ancient writers

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SOCRATES
HIPPIA

Socrates. Hippias, glorious and wise, you have finally arrived to us in Athens!

Hippias. It's all too much time, Socrates. Whenever Elide needs to negotiate with any state, she turns to me before any other citizen, and chooses me as ambassador, considering me the most suitable judge and messenger of those speeches that are usually made from each of the citizens. states Many times I was ambassador to various states, most often and on the most numerous and important matters - in Lacedaemon. This is my answer to your question, because I don’t come to your places often.

Socrates. This is what it means, Hippias, to be a truly wise and perfect person. After all, you know how in private life, taking a lot of money from young people, bring them even greater benefit than this money; on the other hand, you also know how to provide benefits to your state in the public field, as anyone should do who does not want to be despised, but, on the contrary, wants to enjoy good fame among the people. However, Hippias, what is the reason that the ancient men who glorified their names with wisdom - Pittacus, and Bias, and the followers of the Milesian Thales, and even those who lived later, right up to Anaxagoras 1
Pittacus (651–570 BC) and Biantus were among the seven sages. Thales from Miletus, in Ionia (born about 639 BC), also one of the seven - a famous head philosophical school. The famous Anaxagoras already lived under Socrates and was considered his teacher.

, - all or most of them seemed to keep aloof from government affairs?

Hippias. What other reason, Socrates, if not the fact that they were unable and unable to grasp with reason both of them - public affairs and private affairs?

Socrates. This means, I swear by Zeus, just as all other arts have made progress and the old masters are bad compared to those of today, the same will have to be said about your art - the art of the Sophists: it has made progress, and the wise men of the ancients are bad compared to you.

Hippias. Absolutely correct.

Socrates. Therefore, Hippias, if Bias came to life among us now, he would probably make you laugh, just like Daedalus 2
Daedalus is the legendary ancestor of sculptors; The Greeks said about him that he was the first to depict eyes and separate the arms from the body.

Sculptors say that if he appeared now and began to perform the same works as those who created his name, he would be ridiculous.

All this is as you say, Socrates. However, I still usually praise the ancients and those who lived before us first of all and more than the present, since I am wary of the envy of the living and fear the wrath of the dead.

Socrates. You, Hippias, in my opinion, speak and reason beautifully, and I can confirm

...

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ideal knowledge of the general as a law for the individual
In science there are some, although not very reliable, reasons to classify “Hippias the Greater” as a more late period Plato's creativity (even by the time after Plato's first Sicilian trip in 389-387). It seems, however, that in terms of its content this dialogue still dates back to an early period.
In “Ion,” current ideas about beauty are criticized and the irreducibility of beauty to any other human ideas and actions is revealed; in a positive sense, “Ion” mainly points to the divine source of inspiration, which, however, does not go beyond traditional mythological ideas. “Hippias the Greater” is also entirely devoted to the dissociation of the aesthetic area from all other areas human consciousness. But we also find something new in it: the source of beauty is no longer seen here simply as delight bestowed by Apollo and the muses, Plato tries to reveal philosophical meaning beautiful.
The beautiful is considered here from the point of view of essence (oshia), and this, as we will see below, will become the central concept of all Platonic philosophy. Moreover, here for the first time another, purely Platonic term is used - idea. Finally, the beautiful here is interpreted as the meaning (Houoe), or the basis, of essence. This is also an approach to the main Platonic problematic. Thus, “Hippias the Greater” is a direct continuation and clarification of “Ion”, containing the beginnings of mature Platonic terminology.
dialogue composition
1. Introduction (281a - 287b)

              1. The meeting of Socrates with the famous sophist Hippias is depicted and the latter is described as a very self-confident, boastful, pompous person, too careful about his appearance, unprincipled and talkative, but defeating ignorant people with omniscience, aplomb and outwardly brilliant speeches. Because of this, he was not successful in strict Sparta, but all other states are trying to use him for their political goals (281a-285e).
              2. He also composed a whole speech about wonderful activities. This gives Socrates the opportunity to raise the question of what is beautiful itself, and not just individual beautiful objects, a question that presents great difficulties for the sophist (286a - 287b).
              3. The real formulation of the question is this: if just actions presuppose justice in general, and wise actions presuppose wisdom in general, and, therefore, justice is something and wisdom is something, then all beautiful objects presuppose beauty in general, i.e., beauty is also something. It is about this beauty in general, and not about individual beautiful objects, that Socrates poses the question (287b-d).
II. Beauty is not individual things or living beings and not forms of life (287c - 293d)
                1. The beautiful is neither a beautiful girl, nor a beautiful mare, nor a beautiful lyre, nor a beautiful pot, because each such definition would exclude the possibility of being beautiful for all objects except one that appears in the definition (287c-288e). In addition, this kind of partial definition of beauty through some beautiful object would exclude the different degrees of beauty that actually exist in life, since a beautiful girl is more beautiful than a pot, and a beautiful goddess is even more beautiful than a girl (288e - 289c).
                2. The beautiful itself, which, joining any object or living being, makes it beautiful, is, therefore, not some separate object, but a special kind of general idea (єіbod): having joined it, everything becomes beautiful (289d).
                3. This idea, however, cannot be understood physically (which is what Hippias is inclined to do), because if it is gold, then how can one explain that in the famous statue of Phidias, Athena’s eyes, arms, legs, etc. are made not of gold, but of ivory (289e - 290b)? And this idea cannot be understood as something physically “suitable” for another, because, for example, a ladle made of fig tree is much more suitable for cooking porridge than a ladle made of gold (290c - 291d).
                4. Hippias tries to establish what the idea of ​​beauty is, based on the fact that, from his point of view, in the true sense, everything is always and everywhere beautiful and to which he refers health, wealth, honor, luxurious funerals, etc. It costs Socrates nothing to refute either and a similar kind of definition of beauty, because the gods and the heroes descended from them do not bury their ancestors and do not themselves need a luxurious funeral (291d-293b). Next, the interlocutors move in search of a definition of beauty to other positions, now resorting not to everyday everyday experience, but to abstract categories.
III. The beautiful is not any of those categories that under certain conditions can, but under others cannot be beautiful (293e - 304a)
                  1. Beautiful is not suitable or decent (ngknov), even if we understand it not physically, but categorically. After all, what is decent only makes objects seem beautiful, but does not at all ensure that these objects actually, that is, objectively, are beautiful. Thus, the subjectively understood correspondence of one to the other does not yet ensure the beauty of these objects (293e - 295b).
                  2. The beautiful is not useful or suitable (xgrj^i^ov), that is, it is not an objective correspondence of one thing to another. After all, everything that is suitable is suitable not for everything, but for something, while the beautiful is not suitable (295c - 296b). In addition, what is suitable can also be suitable for what is bad, and this is also not at all beautiful (396bc). However, what is useful and for good purposes (agt;lt;peA,i|iov) also cannot be considered necessarily beautiful, since the beautiful in this case would be the cause of the good, and the cause of the object is not yet the object itself: the father is not yet the son (296d - 297c).
                  3. Beauty is not visual or auditory pleasure. After all, laws and activities that are not reducible to sight and hearing, as well as various kinds of physical sensations, can be beautiful, no matter how people hide them (297d - 299b). But even if we agree that the beautiful really comes down to visual and auditory pleasures, then in this case it is necessary to say that vision does not give pleasure because it is sight (for otherwise auditory pleasure could not arise), and hearing does not give pleasure pleasure that he is hearing (for otherwise visual pleasure could not arise). Consequently, the cause of pleasure in both cases is not sight or hearing, but something third that is outside them, but at the same time somehow determines them (299c - 300c). This definition of pleasant sight and pleasant hearing through the beautiful that lies outside of both cannot be understood mechanically. Such an understanding will be a denial of that “being” (essence), which is this third something, and will not help to reveal bodily essences (ochotsata xfjg oysnas;, 301b), which must be kept in mind when considering the relationship between vision and hearing. It is noteworthy that these words were attributed by Plato not to Socrates, but to Hippias; however, Socrates, in agreement with Hippias, speaks of the need to observe the basis of being (Ayuouoe xfjg oshiad, SOIE): what both represent together, that is, each of them; and what each is, both are together. At the same time, however, if we do not talk superficially, then what we obtained general third- this is not just the sum of two terms, because otherwise the two, which is the sum of two units, would be inherent in each individual unit, that is, each of these two units would also be a two (300d - 302b). Consequently, in relation to visual and auditory sensations, it is also necessary to affirm that they are beautiful not due to vision, hearing or their mechanical sum, but due to that “being” (this term is used again in 302c), which is different from them and determines them not in the sense of undivided identity, but in the sense of their new and new specific refraction (302b - 303d). This being cannot be called simply useful, simply good and simply pleasant, it is higher than this (ZOZe - 304a).
IV. Conclusion (304b - e)
Convinced that this kind of debate gives him little benefit, Hippias declares it chatter and idle talk. An antithesis between two interlocutors is put forward: Hippias, knocked down from all positions, prefers to make beautiful speeches in court, in the council and in general before the authorities in order to earn more money; Socrates, this constant seeker of truth, always suffers both from the unscrupulous actors-sophists, who consider him busy with petty and stupid things, and from himself, when he calls things beautiful, but he himself still does not know and is only looking for what the beautiful itself is. by yourself.
criticisms of the dialogue
This analysis speaks for itself. We see that Plato chose here a very clear and simple way of developing his main thought, so that analyzing this dialogue does not seem to be too difficult. A certain uncertainty of the main conclusion remains, of course, here, as in all early Socratic dialogues. But it is quite obvious that the further Plato goes, the more he becomes convinced of the need to explain the variegated diversity of both the sensory world and the realm of mental ideas with the help of firmly established and unshakable categories, which alone make it possible to comprehend the confusion of the real world. human life. There is still no definition of beauty in dialogue. However, the astute reader will certainly notice that, at least in formal terms, this beauty is precisely defined here. It is “essence” and “idea”, which, through their specific meaning, make all beautiful objects beautiful. We are present here at the birth of that Platonic terminology, which in the future will be destined to remain in the history of philosophy forever, right up to the present time, although in the form of the most diverse, one might say infinitely diverse, interpretations.
A. F. Losev
The dialogue is named after the famous sophist Hippias of Elis. About him, see note. 9 to the Apology of Socrates. See also: Gomperz P. Sophistik und Rhetorik. Leipzig, 1912. S. 68-79. About the sophists: Gilyarov A. N. Greek sophists. M., 1888; Chernyshev B. Sophists. M., 1929; Losev A. F. History of ancient aesthetics. Sophists. Socrates. Plato. P. 5-141 (bibliography). For fragments of the works of Hippias, see Diels (Bd II. Car. 86. Russian translation: Makovelsky A. O. Sophists. Issue 2. Chapter 8). Hippias was famous for his “much knowledge,” which did not contribute to the depth of his thought. After all, Heraclitus also said (In 40 Diels): “Much knowledge does not teach intelligence,” and Democritus taught: “A great mind, not much knowledge, should be developed” (In 65 Diels = 424 Poppy); “...many people who know a lot have no intelligence” (B 64 Diels = 425 Poppy). In Plato’s dialogue, Hippias appears extremely arrogant, daring, boastful, but at the same time helpless in defining beauty, which is the topic of Socrates’ conversation with him. “Hippias the Greater” is named for its size in contrast to another dialogue - “Hippias the Lesser”.
The translation of the dialogue “The Greater Hippias” in this edition was made by A. V. Boldyrev; was first published in: Complete collection Plato's works: 15 vols. T. IX; republished in: Plato. Works: In 3 volumes. Volume 1. For this edition, the translation was re-verified by S. Ya. Sheinman-Topshtein. %
                    1. Elis is a region in the western Peloponnese, the birthplace of Hippias. Hippias begins his speech with boasting, and in the words of Socrates addressed to him, irony is felt: “glorious and wise”, below - “wise and perfect”. Many Greek states had the custom of making famous sophists ambassadors: Hippias arrived from Larissa of Thessaly, Gorgias from Leontina (Sicily), Prodicus from Fr. Keos.- 386.
                    2. Socrates, who had just called Hippias wise, here notes that the “ancient men”, famous for their wisdom, “kept aloof from public affairs”; thereby he seems to cast suspicion on the wisdom of Hippias. Pittacus, Biaptus, Fshes have long been among the so-called seven wise men (the rest of them are Chil on, Cleobulus, Solon, Periander. See: Alcibiades I, irom. 46; Menexenus, note 50; Theag, note 12). Pittacus is known as the elected Mytilean supreme ruler - “esimnet” (VII-VI centuries); about him - from the poet Alcaeus, friend, and then political enemy of Pittacus (Fr. 72, 73 // Lyra Graeca / Ed. J. M. Edmonds. Vol. I. London, 1963; see also: Gorgias, note 51). Biant from Priene (6th century), in Ionia, became famous for his saying: “I carry everything that is mine with me.” Thales (VI century) is the largest Ionian natural philosopher, according to whose teaching the material element of water lies at the basis of all things. The sayings of these seven sages are found in Diels (Bd. I. Car. 10). On Anaxagoras, see: Apology of Socrates, approx. 27.- 386.
                    3. Socrates here refers to the art of eloquence and in this sense contrasts himself and the sophists with the wise men of the ancients. Compare: Euthydemus, approx. 19 and 57.- 386.
                    4. See: Ion, approx. 10.-387.
                    5. See: Apology of Socrates, approx. 9; Gorgias.- 387.
                    6. See: Apology of Socrates, approx. 9. Socrates was at one time a student of Prodicus. - 387.
                    7. See: Euthydemus, approx. 32; Protagoras, preamble. - 387.
                    8. 150 min = about 4 thousand rubles. (see: Apology of Socrates, note 12). Inic is a city in Sicily. - 388.
                    9. Compare: Euripides: “I hate the wise man (aofiatg|e) who is not wise for himself” (fr. 905 N.-Sn.). "Sophist" in Euripides is used in general meaning“sage” (see: Protagoras, note 13), and not “sophist”. It is unlikely that Euripides could hate the “sophist”, since he himself was close to the sophists and was influenced by them. - 388.
Wed. the entire subsequent exchange between Hippias and Socrates, especially 283e; see also: Crito, approx. 15.- 388.
  1. Thessaly (N. Greece) was famous for its cavalry. - 389.
  2. Plutarch, talking about the reforms of Lycurgus and his abolition of gold and silver money, writes: “Within Laconia now neither a skilled orator (aoqgt;icrTT)gIoycdv), nor a wandering charlatan fortuneteller, nor a pimp appeared...” (Plutarch. Lycurgus IX // Comparative biographies). The curious comparison of the profession of a sophist with the activities of charlatans is completely in the spirit of Socrates. - 389.
  3. Hippias here fairly objectively assesses the essence of the law, while in general the Sophists strenuously contrasted it with human nature and on this basis believed that everything was permissible to man by nature. In the Protagoras (337d), Hippias directly calls the law a ruler over people (xvpavvog tamp;vavfyxoncov), raping nature. See also: Protagoras, approx. 44.- 390.
  4. Below, Socrates lists a number of sciences in which Hippias considered himself an expert and in which, in his opinion, the Spartans were so ignorant. In the Protagoras (342bc), however, it turns out that the Spartans do not need foreign imitators of the sophists, since they have enough of their own true sages, with whom they communicate secretly from foreigners. - 391.
  5. Pedigrees (genealogies) were extremely common in ancient times. Hecataeus, Acusilaus, Pherecydes, Hellanicus and Hippias himself are known as the authors of ancient genealogies (see: DieFragmentedergriechischenHistoriker / Hrsg. vonF. Jacoby. Erster Teil: Genealogie und Mythographie. A. Text. Leiden, 1957).- 391.
  6. Here in in a general sense, as “rulers” (see: Menexenus, note 17). - 391.
  7. The art of memorization is the so-called mnemonics. See also: Hippias Minor, approx. 11.- 392.
  8. Neoptolemus (Homeric) - son of Achilles; about Nestor, see: Hippias the Lesser, approx. 4. - 392.
  9. Phidostratus - Athenian grammarian. Evdik - character dialogue "Hippias the Lesser". Perhaps Hippias stayed with him in Athens. - 392.
This refers to the oracle’s answer to the Megarians, who exalted themselves above all the Greeks (XIV 48 // Scholia in Theocritum vetera / Rec. Wendel. Lipsiae, 1914). The same answer of the oracle is contained in epigram XIV 73 from the Palatine Anthology (Bd IV Beckby):
The best land on earth is the homeland of the Pelasgians, Argos,
The best mares are Thessalian ones; wives are laconic.
Men - who drink Arethusa's beautiful water.
But even these men are surpassed in glory by people
That they live between Tiryns and sheep-rich Arcadia,
In linen armor, the instigators of wars, the Argives.
Well, you Megarians, neither thirdly nor fourthly,
And twelfth: you don’t count or count.
Per. F.A. Petrovsky in the commentary. to the book: TheokriTu Mosch, Bion. Idylls and epigrams / Transl. and comment. M. E. Grabar-Pasek. M., 1958. S. 278.- 395.
    1. Ionian natural philosopher of the 6th century. Heraclitus of Ephesus was famous for his dialectic; His style was distinguished by its complexity and metaphor, for which he was nicknamed the Dark One. Here we mean fr. In 82 Diels. You can also add fr here. In 102: “With God everything is beautiful, good, fair; people consider one thing fair, the other unjust.” These fragments indicate a hierarchical understanding of beauty in Heraclitus. Here “there are solid and definite, non-fluid forms of beauty... and they are in a definite, by no means non-fluid relationship with each other” (Losev A.F. History of ancient aesthetics. Early classics. M., 1963. P. 350). - 395 .
    2. Heraclitus B 83 Diels (see also note 21).- 396.
    3. See: Euthyphro, approx. 18. Regarding the discussion about the idea of ​​beauty in “Hippia the Greater” and the development of this idea through the sequential development of questions and answers, see: Losev A.F. Essays on ancient symbolism and mythology. M., 1930. P. 342-348.- 396.
    4. We are talking here and below about the statue of Pallas Athena in the Parthenon, sculpted by Phidias (see: Protagoras, note 12). - 397.
26 The oath in the name of the demigod Hercules (see: Lysis, note 7) was very common among the Hellenes. - 398.
      1. See: Apology of Socrates, approx. 25.- 399.
      2. Aeacus - son of Zeus, father of Peleus and grandfather of Achilles; see also: Apology of Socrates, approx. 54 and Gorgias, approx. 80.- 401.
      3. Experiencing torment from the poison that soaked his clothes, Hercules ordered a fire to be built for himself and burned on it (see: Trakhinyanki 1097-1208 // Sophocles. Tragedies / Translated by S. V. Shervinsky. M., 1988). For his suffering, he was taken by Zeus to Olympus, and his shadow, according to Homer (Od. XI 601 - 627), wandered in Hades. Thus, the burial of Hercules is not at all beautiful, but rather terrible and tragic. - 401.
      4. Tantalus - Phrygian king (see: Euthyphro, note 22); Dardanus - the founder of the Trojans; Zeth is a Theban hero. According to myths, these are all children of Zeus and mortal women, that is, demigods, therefore for them to be buried by their descendants or to bury their father is wicked. Pelops, the son of Tantalus (see: Cratylus, note 23), is not a demigod, which means that the burial for him can be wonderful. - 401.
      5. Compare: Ion, approx. 8.- 404.
      6. The terms “suitable” (xefpriliov) and “useful” (axpe^ifiov) used here have a very subtle difference in Plato. Khdtttsou correlates with the term achelat°? (unsuitable), a agt;lt;peXip,ov not only with the term dvaxpeA,f|S (useless), but also with the term (harm
ny). If “useful” is correlated with “harmful,” it means that both of these terms have a more active meaning than the relationship “suitable” - “unsuitable.” The same ratio of “useful” - “harmful” is found in Xenophon (Memoirs... IV 6, 8). E. de Place considers “suitable” to be related and related to “useful” (see: Platon. Oeuvres completes. T. XIV. Lexique de la langue philosophique et religieuse de Platon. Par E. des Places. 2nd partie. Paris , 1964), without going into explanations, especially since the same Xenophon (ibid. IV 6, 9) the term “suitable” is equivalent to “useful”. Elsewhere (Domostroy 6, 4) Xenophon writes: “We have found what is useful - this is everything that a person knows how to use (xQrjaftat). Plato himself in “Meno” (87e) gives the following definition of what is useful: “... every good (tauaFa ) useful... health, strength, beauty and wealth - we call all this and the like useful... But we sometimes say about the same thing that it is harmful.” G. Schmidt in his four-volume “Synonymy of the Greek Language” (Schmidt H. Synonymik der griechischen Sprache. Bd IV. Leipzig, 1886. S. 170-171) comes to the conclusion that HRL0^^ is “suitable in itself,” it is inapplicable for a specific purpose, and (igt;(peA,i|j,ov, on the contrary, is thought to be useful for a specific purpose. Such a clear distinction follows from the words of Xenophon in “Memoirs ..." (II 7, 7): “Or Have you noticed that in order to assimilate the necessary knowledge, to remember what has been learned, for health and strengthening the body... doing nothing and disdain everything is useful ((OfeAltsa) to people, but labor and care are good for nothing (xQЛ0tM-tx)(italics ours. - A.T.-G.).- 406.
      1. The aesthetics of Socrates and his circle gravitate towards a teleological, expedient idea of ​​beauty (xaA,ov). The idea that beauty is the cause of good leads to the advancement of the ethical meaning of beauty. This teleology of beauty in Socratic aesthetics was superbly embodied by Xenophon (see: Taho-Godi A. A. Classical and Hellenistic idea of ​​beauty in reality and art // Aesthetics and art. M., 1966. P. 15-37). Compare: Cratylus, approx. 83.- 406.
      2. Surprisingly, the same definition of beauty, supposedly given to Hippias by Socrates and immediately refuted by him, is given by Aristotle in Topeka (146 a 22). Aristotle's reasoning, however, is too compact. Instead, in his teacher Plato we find a leisurely sequence of questions and answers that present the subject in a much more understandable, accessible and concrete way. O. Apelt (Platon.SamtlicheDialoge. Bd3. S. 101) correctly thinks that this kind of definition of beauty could hardly have belonged to the narrow-minded and boastful Hippias. However, it is difficult to indicate the original author of this definition. - 408.
      3. Some translators (Karpov, Vl. Solovyov) omit Hippias’ question about Socrates’ interlocutor and the latter’s answer, considering, not without reason, that Socrates’ disclosure of his incognito is completely illogical, since Socrates continues to refer to his imaginary interlocutor. Apparently, they believe, this is a later insertion by a copyist. However, the translation of this edition reflects the reading of Barnet and O. Apelt, who correctly believes (Ibid. S. 101, paragraph 52) that Socrates is not ashamed of his imaginary interlocutor, but of himself, participating here in the conversation. - 408.
      4. Corporal entities, or bodies of entities, bodies of being (ayurata xfjsoya "іас;), reading the manuscript. Some commentators, for example O. Apelt (Ibid. S. 103 - 104), read a/gtsshata xfjs otxrtac;, i.e. " relations of being,” since this term confirms the constructive nature of Plato’s thinking and his attempts to abstract from the particular to the general. However, an equally important argument for confirming the manuscript tradition is the consideration of Plato’s sensory-physical understanding of aesthetic and ontological categories right up to the eidos itself. Basically, the tangible and bodily perception of abstract ideas is characteristic of Greek thinking in general and is a consequence of the spontaneous-somatic tendencies of ancient philosophy. Greek there was no word "personality". Man in Greek is understood as adj|ma, i.e. “body”. In “Antigone” by Sophocles (v. 676) it is said ta yaokHa aa^sgO*" (“people”, “people”). In “The Entreaties” of Euripides (v. 224) it is said about astsata abіha (“unjust people”) . Plato in the “Laws” (X 908a), speaking about the protection of “the personal safety of the majority,” expresses himself as follows: Then yaoALoid T(5v aa)|maTa)v. The word aai(jia) is understood in all these cases as something personal. In Xeno. - font ( Greek history II 1, 19) є^єсдєда аlt;оtsata means “free population”. However, if in all these cases a person in the fullness of his spiritual and physical powers can somehow still be called “body,” then in Xenophon’s “Kinegetika” (XII 19) there is one remarkable place (see: Xenophontis scripta minora/Rec. Didorfius . Lipsiae, 18І0), which speaks of the “body of virtue” (as5|sha...arett^), i.e., the ethical concept here is also thought of quite materially and tangibly, as is usually the case in Homer (see, for example, Od. XXIII 156, where beauty is depicted as a fluid material essence that Athena “shed” on Odysseus). Therefore, it is quite legitimate to read in this place and “corporeal entities” and “relations of being.” - 412.
      5. A proverb cited in the dictionary of the Court (Vol. I, p. 735): “We live not as we want, but as we can” (cf. Russian: “Don’t live as you want...”) - with reference to this is the place of “Hippias of the Greater.” - 412.
      6. In the scholia to “Ginpius the Greater” (p. 327 Hermann) the following is said on this matter: “Periander, the Corinthian ruler, being at first a friend of the people, later became a tyrant. Pittacus, who was then ruling the Mytileneans, heard about this and feared for his reputation, sat down at the altar as a supplicant and demanded to be released from power. When asked by the Mytileneans about the reason for this, Pittacus replied that it was difficult to be noble. Having learned about this, Solon said: “The beautiful is difficult,” and from here these words became a proverb.” - 417.

Hippias the Greater

Hippias the Greater

Translation: M.S. Solovyova

Socrates, Hippias

Socrates. Hippias, glorious and wise, you have finally arrived to us in Athens!

Hippias. It's all too much time, Socrates. Whenever Elide needs to negotiate with any state, she turns to me before any other citizen, and chooses me as ambassador, considering me the most suitable judge and messenger of those speeches that are usually made from each of the citizens. states Many times I was ambassador to various states, most often and on the most numerous and important matters - in Lacedaemon. This is my answer to your question, because I don’t come to your places often.

Socrates. This is what it means, Hippias, to be a truly wise and perfect person. After all, you know how in private life, taking a lot of money from young people, bring them even greater benefit than this money; on the other hand, you know how to provide benefits to your state in the public sphere, as anyone should do who does not want to be despised, but, on the contrary, wants to enjoy good fame among the people. However, Hippias, what is the reason that the ancient men who glorified their names with wisdom - Pittacus, and Bias, and the followers of the Milesian Thales, and even those who lived later, right up to Anaxagoras - all or most of them, apparently, held on away from government affairs?

Hippias. What other reason, Socrates, if not the fact that they were unable and unable to grasp with reason both of them - public affairs and private affairs?

Socrates. This means, I swear by Zeus, just as all other arts have made progress and, in comparison with those of today, the old masters are bad, the same will have to be said about your art - the art of the Sophists: it has made progress, and the wise men of the ancients are bad in comparison with you.

Hippias. Absolutely correct.

Socrates. Therefore, Hippias, if Bias were to come to life among us now, he would probably make you laugh, just as sculptors say about Daedalus that if he appeared now and began to perform the same works as those who created his name, he would be funny.

Hippias. All this is as you say, Socrates. However, I still usually praise the ancients and those who lived before us first of all and more than the present, since I am wary of the envy of the living and fear the wrath of the dead.

Socrates. You, Hippias, in my opinion, speak and reason beautifully, and I can confirm the correctness of your words. Indeed, your art has made progress in that it makes it possible to engage in public affairs along with private ones. After all, Gorgias, the Leontine sophist, came here from his homeland in public order, as an ambassador and as a person most capable of all the Leontines for public activity; he turned out to be an excellent speaker in the People's Assembly, and privately, giving demonstrative speeches and studying with young people, he earned and collected a lot of money from our city, with If you like, then our friend, the famous Prodicus, often came here before public affairs, and the last time, recently, having arrived from Keos on the same kind of business, he distinguished himself very much with his speech in the Council, and privately, giving demonstrative speeches and studying with young people, he received a surprising amount of money. And of those ancients, no one ever considered it possible to demand monetary rewards and flaunt their wisdom in front of all kinds of people. That's how simple they were! Didn't notice that money has a high price. Of these two men, each earned more money with his wisdom than other masters with any art, and even before them, Protagoras.

Hippias. You, Socrates, really don’t know anything about this! If you knew how much money I made, you would be amazed! Not to mention the rest, when I once arrived in Sicily, while Protagoras, a famous man and older than me in age, was there, I still, being much younger than him, in a short time earned much more than one hundred and fifty minas, yes Moreover, in just one very small place, Inika, more than twenty minutes. Arriving home with this money, I gave it to my father, so that both he and all the other citizens were surprised and amazed. I think I probably made more money than any two other sophists put together.

Socrates. You, Hippias, provide an excellent and important proof of the wisdom of both your own and modern people in general - how different they are from the ancients! Great was, as you say, the ignorance of the people who lived before. What happened to Anaxagoras, they say, is the opposite of what happens to you: he inherited a lot of money, but through carelessness he lost everything, what a foolish sage he was! And similar things were told about others who lived in the old days. So, it seems to me that you give an excellent proof of the wisdom of modern people compared with former ones. Many agree that a wise man must first of all be wise for himself. It is defined this way: the one who has earned more money is wise. But enough of that. Tell me this: in which of the countries you visit did you earn the most money? Apparently, in Lacedaemon, where do you go most often?

Hippias. No, Socrates, I swear by Zeus!

Socrates. What are you talking about? So Lacedaemon has the least amount of everything? with Hippias. I never received anything there at all. Socrates. You say strange things, Hippias, amazing! Tell me: is not your wisdom capable of making those who follow and learn it more virtuous?

Hippias. And even very much so.

Socrates. So, you were able to make the sons of the Inikians better, but not the sons of the Spartiates?

Hippias. A long way from that.

Socrates. Then, then, the Sicilians strive to become the best, but the Lacedaemonians do not?

Hippias. And the Lacedaemonians are very eager, Socrates.

Socrates. Maybe they avoided communicating with you due to lack of money?

Hippias. No, of course, they have enough money.

Socrates. What is the reason that, although they have both desire and money, and you could help them with the most important things, they let you go unloaded with money? Surely it is incredible that the Lacedaemonians could raise their children better than you can? Or is this true and you agree with it?

Hippias. No way.

Socrates. Perhaps you have failed to convince the young people of Lacedaemon that through association with you they will advance in virtue more than if they associate with their own? Or could you not convince the fathers of these young men that, if only they care about their sons, they should rather entrust them to you than take care of them themselves? After all, it wasn’t out of envy that fathers prevented their children from becoming the best they could be?

Hippias. I don't think it was out of envy.

Socrates. Lacedaemon certainly has good laws?

Hippias. Of course!

Socrates. And in states with good legislation, virtue is valued most highly?

Hippias. Certainly.

Socrates. You know how best of all people to teach it to others.

Hippias. Precisely the most beautiful of all, Socrates!

Socrates. Well, the one who knows how to teach the art of horse riding most beautifully, won’t he enjoy more honor in Thessaly than anywhere else in Hellas, and won’t he receive the most money there, as well as in any other place where are they passionate about it?

Hippias Probably.

Socrates. And the one who can teach the most precious knowledge leading to virtue, will not he enjoy the greatest honor in Lacedaemon? Is it not there that he will earn the most money if he wishes, as well as in any Hellenic city that is governed by good laws? Do you really think, my friend, that it will be more likely in Sicily, in Inica? Shall we believe this, Hippias? But if you order, you have to believe.

Hippias. The whole point, Socrates, is that the Lacedaemonians do not agree with the covenants of their fathers to change laws and raise sons contrary to established customs.

Socrates. What are you saying? The Lacedaemonians do not agree with the precepts of their fathers to do the right thing, but must make mistakes?

Hippias. This, Socrates, I would not say.

Socrates. But wouldn't they do the right thing if they raised their youth better, not worse?

Hippias. That's right, but it is against their laws to give foreign education. Know for sure: if anyone else had ever received money from them for education, then I would have received it, and much more than anyone else; at least they are happy to listen to me and praise me, but, I repeat, they have no such law.

Socrates. What do you say, Hippias, is the law harmful or beneficial for the state?

Hippias. The law is established, I think, for the sake of benefit; sometimes it also causes harm when it is poorly installed.

Socrates. So what? Do not those who make the law lay it down as the greatest good of the state? And without this, is it possible to live according to the law?

Hippias. You are telling the truth.

Socrates. So, when those who try to make laws sin against the good, they sin against what is lawful and against the law. What do you say to this? V