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Operation Overlord. Landing of the allied troops in Normandy. June 1944
At dawn on June 6, 1944, the waters of the English Channel resembled a boiling cauldron. 6 thousand warships and transport ships moved from the ports of Great Britain to the coast of France, the rumble of 11 thousand aircraft shook the air, hundreds of thousands of aerial bombs, shells from naval guns fell on German positions on the coast of Normandy. Parachute landings descended from the sky to the ground and immediately entered into battle. Marines landed on the beach. The “longest day” began - the landing of the Anglo-American expeditionary forces on the western coast of the European continent - the territory of Northwestern France (“The Longest Day” is a novel by the American journalist Cornelius Ryan, written in 1959. It tells the story of “D-Day” , the first day of Operation Overlord for the landing of allied anti-Hitler troops in Normandy. - Auth.). By the end of the day, about 100 thousand soldiers and officers of the Allied armies concentrated on the Norman beaches and began the battle for the expansion of the bridgehead. Thus, a second front was opened in Western Europe. An agreement on its opening was reached at a conference of the leaders of the three allied powers in Tehran, which took place from November 28 to December 1, 1943.
Beginning of Operation Overlord. June 1944
The concept - "second front" - in diplomatic and military correspondence Soviet leadership and the Western allies meant the military operations of the armed forces of the United States and England in Western Europe, namely in Western Europe, for only a crushing simultaneous onslaught on Germany from the east and west, from the territories directly leading the armies of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition to the borders of Germany itself and to the capital of the Third Reich, allowed the Allies to take the citadel of the Nazi bloc in a powerful vice. Only such conditions ensured victory over the Nazi Reich in the entire Second World War.
On June 4, 1943, a message from F. Roosevelt was received in Moscow, in which he, on his own behalf and on behalf of W. Churchill, informed the Soviet government about the measures taken by the allies in the Far East and Africa, about their desire to withdraw Italy from the war in the near future . Concerning the issue of a new postponement of the opening of the second front to 1944, Roosevelt wrote: “According to the current plans in the British Isles in the spring of 1944, enough a large number of men and materials to enable a comprehensive invasion of the continent at this time."
This fact alone contributed to the rapprochement between Roosevelt and Stalin, to the great displeasure of Churchill. Just there, in Tehran, they established friendly relations between Roosevelt and Stalin, which continued until the death of Roosevelt on April 12, 1945.
But there were also considerations of a purely military-strategic nature. First, after the Battle of Kursk World War accepted its inner dynamics. The second front for the USSR was not needed militarily. It became clear to everyone, including Roosevelt, that the Soviet Union was capable of defeating Germany alone. The United States needed a second front in order to establish advantageous post-war positions for control over Europe, over Germany, and through Europe and Germany over the rest of the world in order to acquire trump cards in what was believed to be a post-war bargain with the Soviet Union.
Secondly, it turned out that the school of Roosevelt, who believed that cooperation with the USSR during the war should be continued in cooperation with the Soviet Union after the war, was gaining the upper hand. Without this cooperation, Roosevelt believed, the world would be doomed to an arms race. An arms race, according to Roosevelt, was incompatible with a healthy world economy. It was necessary to create, as he put it, a design of four policemen. These are 4 powers - the United States, the USSR, Great Britain and China. They alone were to retain certain armed forces, all the rest were to be disarmed. Both the defeated and the aggressors. Like the winners, France, Poland, etc. But this had to be done in agreement with the Soviet Union.
The US delegation at the Tehran Conference at first took an indefinite, wait-and-see position on the question of creating a second front against Nazi Germany. However, on the whole, it was guided by the decisions of the Anglo-American conference held in Quebec in August 1943. The decisions of the Quebec Conference were in line with the strategic direction adopted by the government of the United States.
The essence of this strategic attitude was that it was no longer possible to delay the opening of a real second front. On the danger of further delay, and on the perniciousness of the British doctrine that "Germany can be defeated by a series of attritional operations in northern Italy, the eastern Mediterranean, Greece, the Balkans, Romania and other countries - satellites,” pointed out, in particular, US Secretary of War G. Stimson, who wrote to Roosevelt in August 1943: “In the light of the post-war problems that we will face, such a position ... seems extremely dangerous. We, like Great Britain, have made a clear commitment to open a real second front. We cannot count on any of our pinprick operations to deceive Stalin into believing that we are true to our obligations” (Stimson Henry L., Bundy McGeorge. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York , 1947. P. 436-437).
President Roosevelt himself was aware of the danger of a further postponement of the second front. On the eve of the Tehran conference, he told his son that “if things continue in Russia as they are now, then it is possible that next spring there will be no need for a second front!” (Roosevelt Elliot. Through his eyes. - M., 1947. S. 161).
The British delegation headed by Prime Minister Churchill arrived in Tehran with their own plans.
The course of the war, in which "the honor of almost all victories on land belongs to the Russians" (Churchill Winston S. The Second World War, vol. V. Boston, 1951. P.126), disturbed the British even more. more than the Americans. If England, they believed, “does not come out of this war on equal terms” with the USSR, her position in the international arena could change dramatically, and Russia would become “the diplomatic master of the world” (ibid.).
The British ruling circles considered the way out of this situation not only to intensify the military operations of the Anglo-American armed forces, but above all to revise the strategic plans adopted jointly with the Americans in Quebec in August 1943, with the aim of refusing or, at least, further postponing the second front in northwestern France and replacing it with operations in Italy, the Balkans and the Aegean Sea, with access to southeastern Europe and the southwestern border of the Soviet Union.
The acceptance of these plans, most fully set forth in the memorandum of the English Chiefs of Staff Committee dated November 11, 1943, "entirely and completely" approved by the Prime Minister, the British side tried to achieve on the eve of the three-power conference in Tehran in order to speak to the Soviet Union as a united front with the Americans .
The American side, however, actually avoided discussing the issues of European strategy at the Cairo Conference (22-26 November 1943), realizing that " final decisions will depend on the results of negotiations in Tehran with the Russians ”(Matloff M. From Casablanca to Overlord. - M., 1964. P. 418). Churchill was annoyed, but not discouraged by the position of the Americans, and, as the American historian R. Sherwood notes, in Tehran he made "the last and, one might say, desperate attempt" to defend his plans (Sherwood Robert. Roosevelt and Hopkins. Through the eyes of an eyewitness. - M ., 1958. Vol. 2, p. 484). The discussion about the second front was opened by President Roosevelt at the first meeting of the Tehran Conference on November 28, 1943. He reported that at the August 1943 Anglo-American conference in Quebec, a decision was made on the invasion of the Allied forces into France around May 1, 1944. However, the President promptly made the reservation that if the United States and Britain carried out major amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, the invasion of France might have to be postponed for two or three months. The Americans, he said, do not want to “postpone the date of the Channel invasion beyond the months of May or June. At the same time, the President noted, there are many places where Anglo-American troops could be used. They could be used in Italy in the Adriatic Sea, in the Aegean Sea, finally, to help Turkey if she enters the war ”(Churchill Winston S. The Second World War. Vol. V. Boston, 1951. P. 126) .
Roosevelt was interested in the opinion of the Soviet delegation on the question of how the Allies could most significantly alleviate the position of the Soviet Union, as well as how best to use the Anglo-American forces located in the Mediterranean Sea.
USSR, USA and Great Britain I. Stalin, F. Roosevelt, W. Churchill during the Tehran Conference in 1943
The Soviet delegation proposed to take Operation Overlord as the basis for all operations in 1944, that is, a landing in northwestern France, and, as support for it, to carry out an invasion of Southern France - either simultaneously with the first operation, or a little earlier or later.
However, the British Prime Minister again tried to convince Stalin and Roosevelt of the preference for military operations in the Balkans, in the eastern Mediterranean, by postponing Operation Overlord. He tried to replace the opening of a second front in France with the development of operations in Italy and the Balkans, in order to ensure the occupation of Central and South-Eastern Europe by Anglo-American troops in this way, and to transfer the question of the timing of the start of operations across the English Channel to "military specialists" for consideration.
The opening of a viable second front against Nazi Germany was once again in jeopardy. In the prevailing situation, the Soviet delegation showed determination and firmness. . The transition of the Nazis to strategic defense was fraught with great danger in the absence of hostilities in the West. Without a second front, Germany could freely regroup its forces and maneuver its reserves, which would significantly complicate the actions of Soviet troops on the front.
The head of the Soviet delegation therefore repeated that the leaders of the USSR, the USA and Britain should decide three main questions: the date of the start of Overlord, the commander-in-chief of this operation, and the need for an auxiliary operation in southern France.
At a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Britain, held on the morning of November 30, 1943, after a lengthy discussion, it was decided that the United States and Britain would launch Operation Overlord during May 1944, simultaneously with an auxiliary operation in southern France. The last operation will be undertaken on the scale that the available landing craft will permit.
Planning for Operation Overlord. From left to right: Supreme Commander of the Expeditionary Forces in Europe D. Eisenhower, Air Marshal T. Lee-Mallory, Air Marshal A.U. Tedder, Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery
As a result, at the Tehran Conference, the issue of opening a second front in Western Europe was finally resolved and it was agreed that the Anglo-American troops would land in the amount of 35 divisions in north-western France in May 1944, and also that this operation would be supported by the landing of troops in Southern France. Stalin, in turn, announced that the Soviet troops would launch an offensive at about the same time in order to prevent the transfer of German forces from the eastern to the western front. This major decision The Tehran Conference was recorded in a secret agreement, which also contained an equally important clause: "The Conference ... agreed that the military headquarters of the three powers should henceforth keep in close contact with each other regarding upcoming operations in Europe."
The decision taken in Tehran to coordinate the actions of the allies against the common enemy was a success Soviet government. The decision to deliver a crushing joint blow to Nazi Germany was fully in the interests of the anti-Hitler coalition as a whole.
In Tehran, the Soviet delegation achieved a lot. The date for the opening of the second front in Western Europe was determined - May 1944, the issue of the commander-in-chief of this front was resolved. Churchill's Mediterranean strategy, according to which the main forces of England and the United States were to attack Germany through Italy and the Balkans, failed: Roosevelt supported Stalin.
In the "Declaration of the Three Powers" adopted on December 1, 1943, the participants in the Tehran Conference declared full agreement on the scale and timing of operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south. Confidence was expressed that the agreement of the three powers would ensure lasting peace among the peoples.
DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS
We, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met over the past four days in the capital of our ally, Iran, and have formulated and reaffirmed our common policy.
We express our determination that our countries will work together both in time of war and in the subsequent peacetime.
As regards the war, representatives of our military headquarters participated in our round table discussions and we agreed on our plans for the destruction of the German armed forces. We have come to full agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.
The mutual understanding we have reached here guarantees us victory.
As regards peacetime, we are confident that the agreement that exists between us will ensure a lasting peace. We fully acknowledge the high responsibility that rests on us and on all the United Nations for bringing about a peace that will be approved by the vast majority of the peoples of the world and that will eliminate the scourge and horrors of war for generations to come.
Together with our diplomatic advisers, we considered the problems of the future. We will seek the cooperation and active participation of all countries, large and small, whose peoples have dedicated themselves in heart and mind, like our peoples, to the task of eliminating tyranny, slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome their entry into the world family of democracies whenever they wish to do so.
No force in the world can prevent us from destroying the German armies on land, their submarines at sea, and destroying their war factories from the air.
Our offensive will be merciless and growing.
Having concluded our friendly consultations, we confidently look forward to the day when all the peoples of the world will live in freedom, free from tyranny, and in accordance with their various aspirations and their consciences.
We have come here with hope and determination. We leave here true friends in spirit and purpose.
ROOSEVELT
STALIN
CHURCHILL
The Tehran Conference convincingly showed that, despite the fundamental difference in the political and social structure of the USSR, on the one hand, and the United States and England, on the other, these countries could successfully cooperate in the fight against a common enemy, searched for and found a mutually acceptable solution to the disputes that arose between them. issues, although they often approached these issues from completely different positions, which were based, among other things, on the different geopolitical interests of the parties.
Postage stamp of the USSR No. 878 of 1943, dedicated to the Tehran Conference
Viktor Gavrilov, Leading Researcher
Research Institute (military history)
Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
The conference of the leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, held in Tehran on November 28 - December 1, 1943, is one of the largest diplomatic events of the Second World War. It became an important stage in the development of international and inter-allied relations of this period.
The Tehran Conference, during which a number of important issues of war and peace were considered and resolved, played a significant role in rallying the anti-Hitler coalition to achieve final victory in the war and in laying the foundation for the further development and strengthening of Soviet-Anglo-American relations.
The meeting in Tehran convincingly showed that, despite the fundamental difference in the political and social system of the USSR, on the one hand, and the United States and Britain, on the other, these countries could successfully cooperate in the fight against a common enemy, searched for and found a mutually acceptable solution to the problems that arose between them. controversial issues, although they often approached these issues from completely different positions.
The military and political cooperation of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain during the Second World War is one of the greatest lessons of history that cannot be forgotten.
The purpose of this work is to reflect the contradictions that arose at the Tehran Conference between its participants on the key problems of international politics, and to determine the significance of the conference for the further conduct of war and the establishment of peace.
The tasks are to reveal the positions of each of the parties on the main issues and reflect the decisions taken by the conference.
The Tehran Conference is the first meeting of the heads of the three governments.
At the suggestion of the Soviet government, the conference was held in Tehran from November 28 to December 1, 1943. The Tehran Conference is one of the largest diplomatic events of the Second World War. It became an important stage in the development of international and inter-allied relations of this period.
The meeting in Tehran, during which a number of important issues of war and peace were considered and resolved, played a significant role in rallying the anti-Hitler coalition to achieve final victory in the war and in laying the foundation for the further development and strengthening of Soviet-Anglo-American relations.
The Tehran Conference convincingly showed that, despite the fundamental difference in the political and social system of the USSR, on the one hand, and the United States and Britain, on the other, these countries could successfully cooperate in the fight against a common enemy, searched for and found a mutually acceptable solution to the disputes that arose between them. questions, although they often approached these issues from completely different positions.
It was in Tehran that, in the end, the exact date was set for the Allies to open a second front in France and the British "Balkan strategy" was rejected, leading to a prolongation of the war and an increase in the number of its victims and disasters. The adoption by the conference of a decision to deliver a joint and final blow to Hitler's Germany was fully in line with the interests of all countries that were part of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The Tehran Conference outlined the contours of the post-war order of the world, achieved unity of views on issues of ensuring international security and lasting peace. The meeting in Tehran had a positive impact on inter-allied relations, strengthened trust and mutual understanding between the leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The Tehran Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied Powers took place in the context of the outstanding victories of the Soviet armed forces, which led to the completion of a radical turning point in the course of not only the Great Patriotic War but throughout World War II. The Nazis had already been expelled from the Donbass and left-bank Ukraine. November 6, 1943 Kyiv was liberated. By the end of 1943 more than half of the territory of the USSR captured by the enemy was cleared. However, Nazi Germany remained a strong adversary. She still controlled the resources of almost all of Europe.
The results and consequences of the victories of the Soviet Army radically changed the military-political situation in the world, as well as the alignment and balance of forces in the international arena.
The scale of the military operations of the Western allies was, of course, incomparable with the combat operations of the Soviet troops. Landed in Italy after its surrender in September 1943, the Anglo-American troops were opposed by only 9-10 German divisions, while on the Soviet-German front, 26 enemy divisions operated against the Soviet troops, of which 210 were German. And yet, by the end of 1943. The victory of the allied countries over the common enemy has come much closer, and relations between them have grown stronger and stronger.
This was confirmed by the results of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, as well as the agreement reached on a meeting of the leaders of the three allied powers in Tehran.
There were two possible paths for the development of events. The first one admitted that, with the support of the West, fascist Germany could stop the advance of the Soviet army, limiting the Soviet Union within its former borders, and remain on the political map of the world. For this, secret negotiations were held between representatives of Germany and the West.
In turn, Britain feared the strengthening of the USSR in the event of a victory over the Nazis and the possibility of Stalin personally redrawing the map of Europe. The second option assumed further strengthening of ties between the USSR and their allies.
The Soviet leadership urgently needed the opening of a second front by the allies and the continuation of the supply of weapons and equipment, since it was difficult for the USSR to continue the war alone, although by the autumn of 1943 the Soviet Army had significant victories in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk.
Allied interests
Tehran Conference should have outlined ways to achieve the goals of all parties involved.
So the United States wanted to get a guarantee that the Soviet army would enter the war against Japan after the victory over Germany. In this case, they would have been able to greatly reduce their losses and costs.
Britain made plans to continue isolating the USSR and hoped that German military forces would continue to be drawn to the eastern front, and that waging a hard war would weaken potential opportunity the emergence of a "red threat" in Western Europe. In the event of the opening of a second front, it was important for Britain to negotiate the most favorable conditions.
Well, the Soviet Union, being fed up with long-term promises of the allies, wanted to achieve a specific date for the opening of a second front. And enlist their consent for the future to strengthen the sphere of influence in Europe, when the Soviet Army enters there as a liberator.
Disagreements arose in determining the meeting place for the heads of powers of the anti-Hitler conference. Stalin suggested Astrakhan or Arkhangelsk, Roosevelt believed that Alaska was the best place. There were variants of Cairo and Baghdad. But, in the end, they settled on Tehran. Before the war, Iran had strong ties with Germany, but in 1941, British and Soviet troops entered Iran, and there was also a unit of American soldiers providing lend-lease. But the occupation did not prevent the Germans from maintaining a powerful agent network. Four intelligence agencies waged a secret war on the territory of Iran.
Arrival of delegations in Tehran
IN last days November delegations from three countries came to Tehran. Churchill arrived with great fanfare and took up residence in the British Legation building.
For the first time, Joseph Stalin was forced to use an airplane to fly to Iran from Baku, where he traveled on a special letter train. Prior to this incident, the Soviet leader managed by land transport. He was guarded by the 182nd Mountain Rifle Regiment, which was part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Iran.
The most difficult way to the capital of Iran was for US President Roosevelt. He had to cross the Atlantic in 9 days on the battleship Iowa to Algiers, from there to get to Cairo, where Churchill was waiting for the president to agree on a joint position in future negotiations.
Why did Roosevelt stay at the Soviet embassy? There are several answers to this question, and each one is quite convincing in its own way. Firstly, the embassies of Britain and the USSR were located very close opposite each other, so that for the duration of the meetings, the fences of the embassies were dismantled and a corridor fenced with shields was formed so that the passers-by could not be seen. And the US embassy was located far on the outskirts of the city, a daily trip back and forth would have put the lives of the president and members of the delegation at risk. Secondly, there was information about an impending assassination attempt on the heads of the "Big Three" by the German intelligence services. And it is much easier to ensure security in one area, without spraying along the roads and outskirts of the city.
Upon returning from the conference in Washington, US President Roosevelt, speaking to reporters, said that Stalin had invited him to stay at the Soviet embassy for security purposes, since he, Stalin, had become aware of the impending conspiracy and a possible assassination attempt. So the threat from the German agents allowed the leaders of the two powers, living under what is called "one roof", to hold a number of confidential meetings and negotiations. Perhaps this is what predetermined the fate of a particular Tehran conference and the fate of the world in the future.
Ensuring the safety of the Conference participants
The Soviet embassy was located in a huge mansion with adjoining buildings and a large area. The building, where the office was previously located, was converted into the residence of Roosevelt. Thus, a diplomatic complex was created, which was surrounded by three rings of tanks and infantry units.
In Tehran, for three days of the conference, the telephone and telegraph were turned off, the activities of all media were suspended and radio communications were muffled, the city was completely blocked by troops and special services.
Operation Long Jump - Germany's opposition to the Allied meeting
According to the official version, the leadership of Nazi Germany instructed the Abwehr in November 1943 to organize an assassination attempt on the leaders of the Big Three in Tehran. covert operation under the name "Long Jump" was developed and led by the famous fascist saboteur and terrorist SS Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, since 1943 a special agent for special assignments and Hitler's favorite.
His track record included the assassination of Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss in 1934, the arrest of Austrian President Miklas and Chancellor Schuschnigg in 1938, in 1943, on Hitler’s personal order, he developed and carried out an operation to free the deposed Mussolini, for which he was awarded the “Knight’s Order” from the Fuhrer’s hands. cross". He was always lucky, but this time the Soviet intelligence officers broke his plans.
In Iran, Schellenberg's intelligence service was represented by a certain Franz Mayer, a typical young SS man who was fluent in Persian and had very wide connections in the Iranian military, political and business circles.
He ambitiously dreamed of turning neutral Iran into an ally of Germany, for this it was necessary to create and bring to power a strong pro-German nationalist movement. This idea was partially successful; Soviet intelligence reported on more than twenty operating various persuasion but generally anti-allied nationalist organizations.
Iranian Admirers of Hitler
The largest and most disciplined was the "Blue Party", named after the color of the blue ballots of the deputies of the Iranian Majlis. The party was originally organized by opposition members of the Majlis, who did not support the ratification of the Treaty of Union between Iran, the USSR and Great Britain in January 1942 and was headed by public figure Khabibulla Nowbakht, a longtime admirer of Hitler and Nazi Germany led by him.
This illegal party created divisions of the military organization, becoming a real force. Soviet intelligence gave the Blue Party top priority. On August 1, 1941, Ivan Agayants ("Ford") became its resident in Iran. Since 1942, the attention of intelligence officers has been the increasing activity of contacts between illegal German representatives and officers of the Iranian General Staff.
There is information about the possibility of an uprising in the Iranian army, seizing power and striking at the rear of the allies together with the German troops. The Soviet and British intelligence officers working with them managed to deeply infiltrate their agents into the Blue Party, which made it possible to be aware of the actions of the conspirators.
Meanwhile, in the south of Iran, a rebellion was raised by a local ruler and in different places countries were parachuted by a group of German saboteurs. An acute political crisis arose in the country. The special services of Great Britain and the USSR took upon themselves the task of defeating the pro-German underground and its residency.
Preventing the disruption of the Conference and the attempt on the defendants
Mayer was tracked down and arrested by the British just a couple of months before the conference. Under him, a walkie-talkie, ciphers, documents and the entire archive of the Abwehr were captured. As a result of the interrogations, it became known about the impending terrorist attacks during the conference. After his confession about plans to penetrate the Soviet embassy through drainpipes, the British took control of the entire water supply and drainage system.
Another option was to plant explosives under the building of the Soviet embassy. To do this, the Germans wanted to bribe the priest with the only Orthodox Church in Tehran, Father Mikhail, but despite his hatred of Stalin and the Soviets, he refused and revealed the plans of the Nazis to the staff of the Soviet embassy.
Three more ambushes were prepared on the route of Roosevelt's possible route from the US embassy to the place of negotiations. But since the president immediately accepted Stalin's invitation and went to the Soviet embassy, the Germans failed to use this plan. After all the failures, Skorzeny offered the leadership of the Reich a completely straightforward option - to rent a light aircraft, stuff it to capacity with explosives and send it to the Soviet embassy. But while a suicide bomber was being transported to the scene, the politicians had already gone home.
All planned assassination plans by the German services will probably become known after 2017, it was then that British intelligence promised to declassify the archives in this case.
Soviet intelligence officer G. Vartanyan about the special operation to prevent terrorist attacks
The most significant version of the assassination operation was commented on by Gevork Andreevich Vartanyan, a Soviet intelligence officer who spent his whole life working illegally and was declassified only on December 20, 2000. In his personal "iconostasis" is the "Golden Star" of the Hero of the Soviet Union, the Order of the "Patriotic War", the military "Red Banner", the "Red Star", "For Services to the Fatherland".
Gevorg Vartanyan - the legendary intelligence officer who saved the participants of the Tehran Conference from a terrorist attack
During the period described, G. Vartanyan worked in Iran. He said that members of his group discovered a German landing force of six people, thrown out near Tehran.
Having taken the saboteurs under observation, the scouts traced them to the city and established their place of residence. The radio transmissions of the group from Berlin were taken and they were able to decipher. So it became known that the transfer of the second main group under the direct supervision of Otto Skorzeny was expected, this group was supposed to carry out the abduction or destruction of the leaders of the Big Three.
A group of German spies was arrested, the radio operator agreed to work "under the hood" and a radio game began with German intelligence. Despite the great temptation to detain Skorzeny himself, it was decided that the German radio operator should transmit a prearranged signal of failure, and the Center in Berlin refused to send the second group. Since the leaders of the powers were already in Tehran, it was impossible to carry out risky operations.
Decisions taken during the Tehran Conference
It was still almost a year and a half before the final victory over Nazi Germany, but the heads of the three superpowers were already discussing the post-war structure of the world. The American president for the first time voiced the need to create an organization that could ensure a lasting peace after the war and would be based on the principles of mutual cooperation between various countries. Stalin warmly supported this idea.
November 28 - December 1, 1943 in Tehran (Iran) a conference of the leaders of the three allied states of the anti-Hitler coalition was held: Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars Joseph Stalin, US President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
The meeting went down in history as the Tehran Conference. It was the first time that the "big three" - Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill - gathered in full force.
It was fixed in the military decisions that Operation Overlord would be undertaken during May 1944, together with the operation in Southern France, while the Soviet troops would launch an offensive at about the same time in order to prevent the transfer of German forces from the eastern to the western front. It was envisaged that the military headquarters of the three powers should from now on be in close contact with each other with regard to the forthcoming operations in Europe, and that a plan should be agreed between these headquarters to mystify and deceive the enemy in relation to these operations.
Western allies, based on their military-strategic plans in South East Europe, proposed to expand assistance to the Yugoslav partisans and draw Turkey into the war against Germany.
During the discussion about opening a second front importance had a statement by the head of the Soviet government that the USSR was ready to go to war with Japan after the surrender of Germany, despite the existence of a neutrality treaty with this country.
In addition to military issues, issues related to the post-war structure of the world were discussed at the conference. The United States raised the question of dismembering Germany after the war into five autonomous states. Great Britain proposed separating Prussia from Germany, and including the southern regions of the country, together with Austria and Hungary, in the so-called Danube Confederation. The Soviet delegation did not support these plans. It was decided to refer the discussion of the German question to the European Consultative Commission.
At the Tehran Conference, a decision was generally agreed on the transfer of Koenigsberg (now Kaliningrad) to the USSR.
In Tehran, a preliminary agreement was also reached on establishing the borders of Poland along the "Curzon Line" of 1920 in the east and along the Oder (Odra) River in the west. Thus, the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were recognized as having ceded to the USSR.
A "Declaration on Iran" was also adopted, in which the participants declared "their desire to preserve the full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran."
At a conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, the question of creating an international security organization was discussed in advance.
At the end of the conference, the "Declaration of the Three Powers" was published. According to the document, the leaders of the "big three" agreed on plans for the destruction of the German armed forces on the timing and scale of operations undertaken from the east, west and south. The declaration stated the determination of the three states to work together both in time of war and in subsequent times of peace.
The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources
