They call it intention. Religious use of the term

, thinking on any subject.

Unlike desire, which is an attraction, a desire to accomplish something, a plan is understood as a planned plan of action, therefore it seems appropriate to associate intention primarily with a plan [ ] . Intention - communicative intention - can appear in the form of a plan to construct a statement in a particular style of speech, in a monologue or dialogic form. A type of intention is speech (communicative) intention - the intention to carry out a speech act. Intention can also mean unconscious intention, literally: “that which leads me from within to where I want to go.”

In philosophy

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In Roman law

In Roman legal proceedings, in the so-called formulary process, intention is the main part of the claim formula, which sets out the essence of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant.

Religious use of the term

Intention is what someone asks for in prayer. Depending on the interests of the person praying or other persons. Intention can be spiritual or material in nature, personal or general. The intention of the mass is the intention of the priest celebrating the mass, and the people taking part in it, or the person who ordered it. To pray “in the intention of the Pope” means to pray for what the Pope asks. The term is widely used among believers of the Catholic Church.

In Judaism

In Judaism, an analogue of the category “intention” is often called the concept of kavana. According to one description,

Kavanagh- this is the direction of the heart, that is, focused attention, intention, putting your soul into what you do. Kavanah in prayer is an integral part of the commandment itself. In no case should prayer acquire a routine character, becoming a mechanical pronunciation of familiar words. It is said by the Sages: “Prayer without kavana is a body without breath.”

According to Rabbi Chaim Halevi Donin, “Kavana is diametrically opposed to the perfect but mechanical reading and pronunciation of words. Kavanagh can be defined in another way; each definition represents a higher level of Kavanagh, each definition is a call and demand for those praying. The first stage of Kavana involves knowledge and understanding of what is said in prayer. This is followed by the liberation of the spirit from all external, distracting thoughts and complete concentration on prayer. The highest stage of Kavanagh completes everything, when the words of the prayer are pronounced with great dedication, concentration and reverence, thinking about its deep meaning.”

What is "intention"?

INTENT (from Latin intentio aspiration), a term denoting intention, goal. In Stoic philosophy, intention (Greek tonos tension) characterizes the active and ordering function of pneuma (or world substance). IN medieval philosophy the term intention was used to denote the will and its goals. Thus, for Augustine, intention means the direction of the soul towards a goal, that is, towards God. In Abelard’s Ethics, a distinction is made between an act and an intention (intention): only a person’s intention (inaccessible to knowledge from other people) is subject to moral evaluation by God, while any act in itself is ethically neutral. Alexander of Gaels includes in the definition of intention (in addition to the goal) also that which allows us to reach the goal, thereby overcoming the dualism of intention and action. For Thomas Aquinas, intention and choice are the two constitutive elements guided by the practical reason of the free moral act of the will. In this regard, Pascal ironized about the Jesuit way of directing intention, that is, justifying good intentions unseemly acts.
In the 12th century in connection with translations of Ibn Sina's works into Latin philosophical language a distinction is introduced between the first intention and the second intention. The first intentions are understood as the cognizable objects themselves, the second intentions are logical intentions: genera, species, distinctive features, and in general everything logical concepts and terms that can be attributed to a cognizable object. For Thomas Aquinas, intention means the image of a cognizable thing, located in the soul and different from this thing itself; intention is a means for comprehending an object to be known, but not the cognizable object itself.
IN modern philosophy the concept of intentionality is more widespread (F. Brentano, E. Husserl, J. Searle), however, in Husserl’s phenomenology the concept of intention is also found, which is characterized as an essential property of an act (Aktcharakter) and acts as a genus in relation to a certain kind of mental experience ( allocated on the basis of relation to the subject). In a narrow sense, intention is empty, not associated with the visual representation or perception of an object, remaining its pure positing. IN in a broad sense intention includes acts of realization of reference to an object when the latter is given to us in the corresponding visual contemplation.
Intention (lat. intentio desire) the orientation of consciousness, thinking towards any object; This orientation is based on desire and intention.
Unlike desire, which is an attraction, a desire to accomplish something, a plan is understood as a planned plan of action, therefore it seems appropriate to associate intention primarily with a plan. Intention, a communicative intention, can appear in the form of a plan to construct a statement in a particular style of speech, in a monologue or dialogic form. A type of intention is speech (communicative) intention - the intention to carry out a speech act. Intention can also mean an unconscious intention, literally: “that which leads me from within to where I want to go.” Ecclesiastical use of the term
Intention is what someone asks for in prayer. Depending on the interests of the person praying or other persons. Intention can be spiritual or material in nature, personal or general. The intention of the mass is the intention of the priest celebrating the mass and the people taking part in it, or the person who ordered it. To pray in the intention of the Pope means to pray for what the Pope asks for. The term is widely used among believers of the Catholic Church.

Wikipedia is a good thing 😉

The meanings of “intentio” can be divided into two semantic subgroups: practical and theoretical. The first includes its use to denote the will and its goals. Thus, in Augustine it denotes the direction of the soul towards a goal, which in a positive sense can only be God. At the same time, “mind” (“animi intentio”), according to Augustine, constitutes - along with the object that we perceive and the act of our perception - an essential element of knowledge. Particularly clear practical significance“intentio” is found in the “Ethics” of P. Abelard, who draws a line between an act (opus) and an intention (intentio), meaning that only a person’s intention (inaccessible to knowledge by other people) is subject to moral evaluation by God, in while either in itself is ethically neutral. Further practical problems of “intentio” in the Middle Ages follow the line of searching for objective criteria for moral assessment, which is achieved by integrating into the intention to be assessed not only the goal, but also the means of its implementation. Thus, A. Gales includes in intentio, in addition to the goal, also “that which allows us to reach the goal,” thereby overcoming intentions and actions, which is further consolidated in both Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. For the latter, intentio and (electio) constitute two constitutive elements of a free moral act of will guided by practical reason. In modern European philosophy, B. Pascal is known regarding the Jesuit method of “directing intention,” i.e. justify unseemly actions with good intentions.
Theoretical intentio in lat. language appears in the 12th century. in connection with the lane works of Ibn Sina and Arab. the words “ma"na”, which introduced into Latin philosophy the distinction of “first I.” and “second I.”: “The subject of logic is intentions that are cognizable in the second place, which are attached to intentions that are cognizable in the first place.” The first I. are understood here as the cognizable objects themselves, and the second ones are “logical I.”, such as that. : genera, species, distinctive features and, in general, all logical concepts and terms that can be attributed to a cognizable object. In Thomas Aquinas, I. in a theoretical sense is closely connected with his doctrine of knowledge and means “” of a cognizable thing, located in the soul and different. from this thing itself, I. is for the comprehension of an object subject to knowledge, but not the cognizable itself. Synonymously, I. speaks of the types (species) and forms of things (forma rerum). At the same time, several varieties of I are distinguished. In late scholasticism, I is introduced. . as an act and as a relationship (this and others are found in I. Duns Scotus), W. Ockham, calling “really existing intentia prima,” considers “second intention” a pure act of intellect.
In modern philosophy, intentionality is more common (F. Brentano, E. Husserl, J. Searle), but in Husserl’s phenomenology the concept of I (“descriptive intention”) is also found, which is characterized as the essential act of intention and is used in relation to to a certain kind of “mental experience,” namely those that are distinguished on the basis of “attitude to an object,” and in a double sense. In the narrow (and predominantly used) sense, information is “empty”, not associated with visual representation, perception, etc. of an object, remaining its pure positing. In a broad sense, information includes acts of realization of relatedness to an object when the latter is given to us in appropriate visual contemplation. Husserl's semantics is built, in particular, on the concept of “I. meaning" and "realization", or "filling", of this I. meaning. If the first makes an expression (for example, on paper) meaningful, then the second allows one to determine the truth or falsity of statements on the basis of the realized conjugation with the object implied in the statement.

Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivina. 2004 .

INTENT

(from lat. intentio - desire), the term scholastic. philosophy, denoting intention, focus of consciousness, thinking on Ph.D. item. In Thomas Aquinas and in late scholasticism the term “I.” also denotes attention, sometimes - a certain form of being, taken into account. respect. In gnoseo-logical. aspect I. acts as a characteristic of intelligence. "image", idea or some meaning. Thomas Aquinas considers intelligence as a concept arising from the activity of the intellect. According to Occam, “I. souls" is a universal, i.e. universal, as an act of comprehension of an object. I. intellect is compared with the “intelligible form” (idea), because it reflects in the mind what has been comprehended. At the same time, scholastic. develops about the “intentional sensory-perceptual form”, i.e. feelings. image of an idea k.-l. object.

General scholasticism - first and second I. First I. (iotentio prima) is a concept originally formed by the mind; the object of such a concept is a given person. mind. Second I. (intentio secunda) is formed through the first, by studying and comparing them. Its object is in the mind itself, representing the logical. , the shape itself or Ph.D. thought in general. Based on the distinction between the first and second I. Thomas Aquinas defined logic as the doctrine of the second I., converted and classified as the first. The doctrine of I. played means. role in logical and epistemological debates between nominalists and realists.

See what “INTENTION” is in other dictionaries:

- (Latin intentio “aspiration, intention”) the orientation of consciousness, thinking towards any object; This orientation is based on desire and intention. Unlike desire, which is attraction, the desire for... ... Wikipedia

intention- (from Latin intentio aspiration) the orientation of consciousness, thinking towards any object. Brief psychological dictionary. Rostov-on-Don: “PHOENIX”. L.A. Karpenko, A.V. Petrovsky, M. G. Yaroshevsky. 1998. intention... Great psychological encyclopedia

- (from Latin intentio aspiration) 1) term denoting intention, goal; 2) in Stoic philosophy, intention (Greek tonos “tension”) characterizes the active and ordering function of pneuma (or world substance). In medieval philosophy the term... ... Political science. Dictionary.

intention- and, f. intention f., German Intention, floor. intentionia lat. intendere to plan, to plot. outdated Intention, intention. It would just be against the author’s intention, because that’s not the big deal. Storm Archit. 1709 73. I was forced... ... Historical Dictionary Gallicisms of the Russian language

Intention- Intention ♦ Intention A volitional impulse that exists in the present, but is aimed at the future or at the pursued goal. Intention is the projection of the will or its goal. Intention is intention. In this sense, they talk about the morality of incentives, according to... ... Philosophical Dictionary Sponville

- [lat. intentio aspiration] orientation of consciousness, thinking on what l. item; intention, goal. Dictionary of foreign words. Komlev N.G., 2006. intention (te), and, g. (French intention, German Intention... Dictionary of foreign words of the Russian language

Content; goal, intention Dictionary of Russian synonyms. intention noun, number of synonyms: 3 intention (23) ... Dictionary of synonyms

INTENT- (from Latin intentio - desire). Orientation of consciousness to what direction? item; to solve a problem or problem. This orientation is based on desire and intention. Unlike desire, which is an attraction, the desire for fulfillment... New dictionary methodological terms and concepts (theory and practice of language teaching)

, thinking on any subject.

In philosophy

Religious use of the term

In Judaism

In Judaism, an analogue of the category “intention” is often called the concept of kavana. According to one description,

Kavanagh- this is the direction of the heart, that is, focused attention, intention, putting your soul into what you do. Kavanah in prayer is an integral part of the commandment itself. In no case should prayer acquire a routine character, becoming a mechanical pronunciation of familiar words. It is said by the Sages: “Prayer without kavana is a body without breath.”

(lat. intentio) - lat. the word "intentio" has a wide range of meanings. In the Middle Ages it was used to translate Greek. the word “tonos” (“tension”) is a term of Stoic philosophy that characterizes the active and ordering function of pneuma or, ed. authors, world matter. In the medieval tradition, the meanings of “intentio” can be divided into two semantic subgroups: practical and theoretical. The first includes its use to denote the will and its goals. Thus, in Augustine it denotes the direction of the soul towards a goal, which in a positive sense can only be God. At the same time, “attention of the mind” (“animi intentio”), according to Augustine, constitutes - along with the object that we perceive and the act of our perception - an essential element of knowledge. A particularly clear expression of the practical meaning of “intentio” is found in the “Ethics” of P. Abelard, who distinguishes between an act (opus) and an intention (intentio), i.e., only a person’s intention (inaccessible to knowledge from the outside) is subject to moral evaluation on the part of God. other people), while any act in itself is ethically neutral. Further development of the practical problems of “intentio” in the Middle Ages follows the search for objective criteria for moral assessment, which is achieved by integrating into the intention to be assessed not only the goal, but also the means of its implementation. Thus, A. Gales includes in the definition of intentio, in addition to the goal, also “that which allows us to reach the goal,” thereby overcoming the dualism of intention and action, which was later consolidated by both Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. For the latter, intentio and choice (electio) constitute two constitutive elements of a free moral act of will guided by practical reason. In modern European philosophy, B. Pascal’s irony regarding the Jesuit way of “directing intention” is known, i.e. justify unseemly actions with good intentions. Theoretical semantics of intentio in Lat. language appears in the 12th century. in connection with the lane works of Ibn Sons and the Arab, the words “mana”, which were introduced into Lat. Philosopher language difference "first I." and “second I.”: “The subject of logic is intentions that are cognizable in the second place, which are added to the intentions that are cognizable in the first place.” By the first I. we mean here the cognizable objects themselves, and by the second - “logical I.”, such as: genera, types, distinctive features, and in general all logical concepts and terms that can be attributed to a cognizable object. In Thomas Aquinas, I. in a theoretical sense is closely connected with his doctrine of knowledge and means the “image” of a knowable thing, located in the soul and different from this thing itself; I. is a means for comprehending an object subject to knowledge, but not the knowable object itself . Synonymously, I. refers to the types (species) and forms of things (forma rerum). At the same time, several varieties of I. are distinguished. In late scholasticism, the meaning of I. as an act and as a relationship is introduced (both understandings are found in I. Duns Scotus). W. Ockham, calling “a really existing thing intentia prima,” considers “second intention” a pure act of intellect. In modern philosophy, the concept of intentionality is more widespread (F. Brentano, E. Husserl, J. Searle), but in Husserl’s phenomenology the concept of I. (“descriptive kind of intention”) is also found, which is characterized as an essential property of the act of intention and is used in relation to a certain kind of “mental experience,” namely those that are distinguished on the basis of “attitude to the object,” and in a double sense. In the narrow (and predominantly used) sense, information is “empty”, not associated with visual representation, perception, etc. of an object, remaining its pure positing. In a broad sense, information includes acts of realization of relatedness to an object when the latter is given to us in appropriate visual contemplation. Husserl's semantic concept is built, in particular, on the concept of “I. meaning" and "realization", or "filling", of this I. meaning. If the first makes an expression (for example, a sign on paper) meaningful, then the second allows us to raise the question of the truth or falsity of statements on the basis of the realized conjugation with the object implied in the statement.

Definitions, meanings of words in other dictionaries:

Philosophical Dictionary

1. (from intentio - desire, lat.) A condensed (unexpanded) image on which maximum attention is focused here and now. This image may have one or another semantic, sensory-affective and volitional coloring. In the extreme case, the figurative side, implying a certain...

Philosophical Dictionary

(Latin intentio - intention) - 1) in the theory of knowledge, the direction or aspiration of the knowing mind towards its object, as it is given to human consciousness; in Thomism, this is an intellectual-volitional act, the first element of our conscious actions performed in the pursuit of...